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France has seen the rise of a number of groups and associations protesting against the French
government. Lise Herman writes that these movements are only loosely connected and have
emerged in response to the government’s agenda on LGBT rights, education and family law. She
argues that it has been difficult for the mainstream parties to establish a firm response given the
heterogeneity of the groups involved, with the government caught between the protesters and
abandoning the agenda of their own supporters.
In an interview published on 2 February in the Journal du Dimanche, French Home Secretary
Manuel Valls called for a reaction of the left against the birth of what he termed a ‘Tea party à la
française’. Opposing the current Socialist majority, a number of unorthodox social movements have indeed emerged
since 2012. While it is debatable whether a comparison with the right-wing Tea Party movement in the United States
is appropriate, the Minister’s concern is directed towards a relatively new and multifaceted phenomenon of French
politics. Positioned on the right or the far right of the political spectrum, these movements have often sat
uncomfortably under the same banner. They nevertheless raise similar problems for the more traditional forces of
the French party system.
Protests against the Socialist government’s societal policies
These grass-root movements have mostly emerged in
reaction to the current majority’s societal agenda on
issues related to gender, education and family. The
French Parliament’s discussion in the autumn and
spring of 2013 of a law authorising same-sex marriage
most certainly acted as a trigger in this regard. Six
protests were organised by a new born collective of 37
associations baptised La Manif pour tous (‘The Protest
for all’). With slogans ranging from the defence of
childrens’ rights to the denunciation of a ‘fascist state’,
marches on 13 January, 24 March, and 26 May 2013
each united between 300,000 and 1 million protesters in
Paris alone, with smaller scale protests organised in
most other major French cities.
While the collective has lost much of its potential for
mobilisation since the adoption of the law in April last
year, other societal policies have sparked discontent. In
January, between 16,000 and 40,000 people marched
in Paris against a law facilitating women’s recourse to
abortion. Protesting against the supposed influence of
‘gender theories’ on the education of their offspring,
parents in approximately one hundred French Schools decided to keep their children at home on 24 and 27 January.
A reform of French family law, including among other measures the consolidation of surrogate parents’ legal status
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and the facilitation of paternity leave, also recently gave a second life to the Manif pour tous collective. On 2
February it united between 50,000 and 80,000 protesters in Paris to denounce the government’s ‘familiphobie‘.
A nebula of right-wing organisations
Behind these protests, four different types of organisation can be distinguished. On the one hand, there are
associations that embody traditional forms of social conservatism, such as the Confédération Nationale des
Associations de Familiales Catholiques, or the pro-life association Alliance Vita. Typically, these associations and
those who follow them are loosely aligned with the stances of the Parti Chrétien Démocrate, a small political party
allied to the centre-right Union pour un Mouvement Populaire  (UMP).
A second group includes a younger and more radical generation of catholic traditionalists, united in organisations
such as Civitas, Renouveau Français or the more recently founded collective Printemps Français. These
movements are prone to using direct action and protests as means of exerting political pressure. More traditionally
conservative organisations have thus been reluctant to associate with these movements, the Manif pour tous having
for instance excluded the Printemps Français from its ranks in March 2013.
A third ensemble comprises openly racist and homophobic groups, such as Unité Radicale, dissolved in 2002 and
reformed under the name Bloc Identitaire, or the neo-fascist Group Union Défense (GUD), Troisième voie and
Jeunesses Nationalistes Révolutionnaires (JNR).
Finally, France has witnessed the growing popularity of more unorthodox forms of far-right currents. The antisemitic
stances of ideologue Alain Soral and closely affiliated humorist Dieudonné M’bala M’bala are gathering an
increasing number of followers on the internet. Especially popular amongst French citizens of second or third
generation immigrant origin, the comedian has politicised his discourse over the last few years. His gesture, the
“quenelle“, has become a rallying point among his followers.
While these different movements have often sat uneasily under the same banners, their common target is de facto
connecting them, albeit in a loose manner. Despite the unease of traditional social conservatives, Catholic
reactionaries and radical groups have been present in much of the protests described above. Neo-fascist
movements also appear to have accumulated vigour (or at least visibility in the media) in the movements against the
PS government’s societal measures.
A case in point has been the involvement in June 2013 of Troisième Voie and JNR members in the violent death of
19-year old anti-fascist and gay rights activist Clément Méric. As for the ‘quenelle’ movement, it is also loosely
connected to the opposition against the current government’s societal policies. For instance the association Egalité
et Réconciliation, which launched rumours concerning the threat of ‘gender theory’ being taught in primary schools,
is run by an open supporter of Dieudonné, Farida Belghoul.
Uncertain reactions to a loosely connected movement
The heterogeneous nature of this movement has complicated the formulation of a coherent response by more
traditional political forces. The UMP has certainly had the easiest task in this regard. While denouncing violent
excesses, it continued to support the objectives of these different protests. In this regard, the centre-right party even
had official representatives in the marches of spring 2013 against same-sex marriage.
The far-right Front National (FN), on the other hand, has struggled to define its position. Certainly, it vocally opposed
the reforms denounced by these movements. It also cultivates informal links with many of the organisations cited
above: members of the FN often taking part in a larger and more radical nebula of far-right organisations. Perhaps
for this very reason, the party has not been a vocal actor in this debate, refraining for instance from sending an
official delegation to any of these protests.
Indeed, in recent years the FN has strived to become a more acceptable political actor, purporting to defend
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secularism and the values of the French Republic. While the party’s leaders still depict French citizens of Muslim
confession and immigrants as a threat to such values, open anti-semitism, racism, and homophobia, are now
proscribed from the FN’s official position. With many of their grass-roots supporters still sharing such views,
remaining discreet on the societal agenda can be read as a way for the FN to avoid confronting its own
contradictions.
As for the PS, its reactions have been inconsistent. Certainly, it has maintained a firm position against the more
radical manifestations of this wave of discontent. Following the death of Clément Méric, the government initiated a
procedure of dissolution against two neo-fascist groups. In a similar vein, some of Dieudonné M’bala M’bala’s shows
have recently been banned for compromising public order. The socialist majority has been far more timid, however,
in the defence of its societal agenda. While same-sex marriage was indeed adopted by the French Parliament,
President Hollande nevertheless conceded to Mayors the right to refuse celebrating such marriages.
Following the more recent protests of the Manif pour tous, the government also renounced its family law reform. In
this regard, the socialist majority seems unwilling to fight on the economic and social fronts at once. Indeed, it is
already engaged in negotiations to conclude a Responsibility Pact with business representatives, a project which is
getting much criticism from the left of the political spectrum. By backing down on its reform of family law, the
government is thus avoiding the risk of seeing both right and left-wing street opposition a few weeks away from the
March 2014 local elections. Still, this move is both symbolically heavy, and politically risky: for the core of the PS
electorate, societal measures remained the government’s last ticket to left-wing credibility.
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